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CFSP: The Capability-Expectation Gap 
Revisited 
A Data-based Analysis 
Annegret Bendiek, Minna Ålander and Paul Bochtler 
The global political situation in Europe’s neighbourhood has deteriorated dramatically 
in recent years, and this has had significant consequences for the European Union 
(EU). Conflicts are multiplying in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean Sea; Russia 
and China are showing increasingly expansive tendencies in South Eastern Europe; and 
the USA is becoming less and less reliable as a security provider for Europe. Against 
this background, it is striking that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
still falls far short of what would be expected from the EU given the size of its inter-
nal market. The unanimity principle in the Council of the EU is often blamed for this. 
However, an analysis of CFSP data shows that the Member States are clearly satisfied 
with symbolic policy measures, despite their political rhetoric. This situation will not 
be resolved either by introducing simple majority voting or with mere declarations of 
political will from governments. The dialogue on the future of Europe should be seen 
as an opportunity to remedy the inability to act in the field of foreign policy by har-
monising the CFSP. 
 
In the 1990s, intergovernmental coopera-
tion in the EU was accompanied by the ex-
pectation that it was only a matter of time 
before political union would be achieved 
in the CFSP. The establishment of the Euro-
pean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 
1999, the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe in 1999, the two rounds of enlarge-
ment in 2004 and 2007 and the more than 
20 civilian, military and civil-military mis-
sions or operations undertaken until 2009 
were considered by many as milestones 
along the path to a common European for-
eign and security policy. This expectation 
still exists today. The “geopolitical commis-
sion”, under European Commission Presi-
dent Ursula von der Leyen, reflects the 
aspirations of the current Commission and 
of Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representa-
tive (HR) for Foreign and Security Policy. Ac-
cording to Borrell, the EU should learn the 
language of power and act geopolitically 
with more realism and internal unity. A 
backward-looking foreign policy on the part 
of the Member States would harm both the 
countries themselves and the Union. In her 
State of the Union address in September 
2020, von der Leyen called for the intro-
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duction of qualified majority voting in the 
Council for imposing restrictive measures, 
i.e. for the implementation of sanctions and 
for taking action in the event of human 
rights violations. 
Low Outcome 
So far, few of these demands have been 
met. The lack of capacity to act within 
the framework of the CFSP is reflected in 
the results of intergovernmental decision-
making procedures, understood here as 
CFSP output. But who does the EU want to 
reach or what does it want to achieve with 
its CFSP, and what impact does it seek to 
have? The answer to these questions is pro-
vided by looking at CFSP output. The effects 
of CFSP output (understood as outcome), on 
the other hand, are very difficult to meas-
ure, since actual EU policy towards or in 
third countries often deviates from the 
declared goals. A cursory glance reveals the 
extent to which the strategic interests of the 
Member States, but also of the EU institu-
tions, have differed in the context of the 
CFSP in the last few months alone. Foreign 
policy decisions are frequently blocked. In 
early 2019, Italy blocked sanctions against 
Venezuela. Some NATO countries, mindful 
of Washington’s stance, prevented the EU 
from taking a position against the collapse 
of the INF Treaty. Poland and Hungary tor-
pedoed the conclusions of an EU summit 
with Arab states because they did not agree 
with passages on migration. 
The EU’s policy in the Middle East has 
also lacked coherence for some time. The 
conflict between the USA and Iran, which 
culminated in the killing of Iranian major 
general Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 
and the Iranian attack on a US military base 
in Iraq, revealed a rift in the CFSP. On the 
one hand, the EU tried to position itself as a 
mediator and repeatedly called for de-esca-
lation. On the other hand, the numerous, 
and sometimes contradictory actions taken 
by the EU institutions and Member States 
undermine the EU’s foreign policy cred-
ibility. For example, the EU did not give a 
good impression when the new President 
of the Council, Charles Michel, commented 
on the killing of Soleimani before the HR 
had made a statement, which indicated an 
inter-institutional power struggle when it 
came to the EU’s external representation. 
Disagreement also dominated between 
Member States. Germany, France and the 
UK (E3 countries) supported the USA, while 
other Member States disagreed with the E3. 
The trading company INSTEX, a European 
special-purpose vehicle which was founded 
to uphold trade with Iran bypassing US 
sanctions, has so far had little effect. Apart 
from Germany, France and Great Britain, 
only six other European states (Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway 
and Sweden) had joined INSTEX by April 
2020. So far, INSTEX has only carried a single 
transaction, which concerned medical 
devices, a category of goods that is exempted 
from secondary US sanctions anyway. 
The EU has not yet been able to formu-
late a common policy on the Trump ad-
ministration’s initiative to find a two-state 
solution for Israel and Palestine. Despite 
this, Josep Borrell strongly criticised the 
American proposals, stating that they de-
parted from international agreements. A 
similar situation emerged after a video 
conference of EU foreign ministers in May 
2020, when they were unable to reach a 
common standpoint against Israeli anne-
xations of the West Bank. At the same time, 
the General Assembly called for increased 
pressure on Israel, stating that unilateral 
action by the Israeli government in Jeru-
salem would have consequences. 
Member States also failed to respond to 
the calls by the HR at the end of August 
2020 for an increase in military capabilities 
for the EU Operation IRINI to enforce the 
UN arms embargo on Libya. The lack of 
consensus among EU countries is also re-
flected in the fact that policies are played 
off against each other. Since the discovery 
of large gas deposits in the eastern Mediter-
ranean, Turkey, Cyprus and Greece have 
been in fierce conflict over their exploita-
tion. Only after many weeks did Cyprus 
abandon its veto on sanctions on Belarusian 
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representatives of President Alexander 
Lukashenko’s regime at the beginning of 
October 2020. 
The call for more EU unity was clearly 
expressed by HR Borrell in May 2020 in an 
article published in several European daily 
newspapers calling for diplomatic discipline 
and for Member States to work together 
to counter the Chinese divide et impera 
approach. The discrepancy between the 
ambition of the new HR and the diverging 
positions of the Member States was further 
highlighted when, in late May 2020, the 
Chinese People’s Congress mandated Hong 
Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam to adopt 
a new Security Law for the special adminis-
trative region (SAR). Despite Borrell’s call 
for a “more robust” strategy towards China, 
it took several attempts by Member States 
to agree on common measures in July 2020, 
including a ban on exports of surveillance 
technology and dual-use goods. 
In summary: EU Member States are pos-
sessively trying to protect their national 
competences and are not making any seri-
ous effort to overcome their lack of con-
sensus at supranational level. Nor do the EU 
institutions agree on who should represent 
the EU externally and who should make it 
politically accountable internally. 
CFSP Output 
The low level of CFSP outcome is matched 
by a low level of a results-oriented output 
(see Division EU / Europe, WP 2020/no. 02). 
According to Article 40 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU), the CFSP and other 




Source: Minna Ålander, Annegret Bendiek and Paul Bochtler, A Critical Perspective on Data Transparency in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
European Union, Berlin: SWP Research Division EU / Europe, Working Paper (WP) 2020/no. 02, November 2020, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ 
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cific internal decision-making procedures. 
Legislation is excluded from the CFSP. The 
main CFSP decisions – whether the estab-
lishment of a CSDP mission, the decision on 
sanctions or the positioning of the EU in 
key foreign policy issues – are taken by the 
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) (see Division 
EU / Europe, WP 2020/no. 02, Table 1, p. 7). 
However, its politically binding decisions 
have no direct legal implications for the 
Member States. 
An analysis of the EUR-Lex database 
shows that between 2009 and 2020, the 
Council adopted 506 decisions on sanctions, 
245 decisions on EU missions and opera-
tions, 123 decisions appointing special rep-
resentatives and 86 decisions on arms con-
trol regimes (see Chart 1, p. 3). Another 94 
decisions concerned institutional innova-
tions such as the creation of agencies or 
other arrangements and agreements. In 
total, since 2009 the Council has adopted 
1,045 politically binding but legally non-
binding decisions in the CFSP and 1,146 
legislative acts in other policy areas. 
The figures indicate a growing discrep-
ancy between the relatively high quantita-
tive output in the CFSP and a de facto lack 
of results-oriented policy towards third 
countries. In fact, since 2009, the EU has 
conducted only 114 election observations, 
12 military operations and 25 other mis-
sions (humanitarian, rule of law, police), 
and has withdrawn its call for political and 
economic reform in neighbouring countries 
(see A. Bendiek, Europa verteidigen). At pres-
ent, the EU has only 6 ongoing military 
operations and 11 civilian missions. There 
are currently 7 Special Representatives to 
third countries or regions as provided for 
in Article 33 TEU. By comparison, the Orga-
nization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), which is also intergovern-
mental, has adopted fewer resolutions but 
currently maintains a total of 16 civilian 
field operations. The OSCE has 57 partici-
pating states, is active on three continents 
(Asia, Europe and North America) and has 
a population of over a billion. 
CFSP output also calls into question the 
special legal position of the CFSP within the 
EU’s Treaty structure. Formally, the decision-
making procedures of the CFSP do not lead 
to legislative acts. The introduction of quali-
fied majority voting in the CFSP could be 
a door opener for a new CFSP-related inter-
institutional agreement between the Coun-
cil and European Parliament with the aim 
of making CFSP decisions more legally bind-
ing for Member States. Evidence of the EU’s 
external action beyond the CFSP is provided 
by the data on public votes in the FAC, which 
the Council of the EU makes available 
through the publicly accessible register of 
documents and the “Open Data Initiative”. 
An analysis of these data shows that in 
other Council formations, a total of 92 deci-
sions were taken in the “Foreign Affairs” 
policy field between 2009 and 2020. Each of 
the Council’s ten configurations can adopt 
legislative acts on behalf of the Council as a 
whole. The FAC has adopted 36 legislative 
acts, but these have no connection with the 
CFSP. 
Overall, the question arises as to the 
meaning and purpose of the special role of 
the CFSP as enshrined in Article 40 of the 
TEU. If the aim is to make the decision-
making procedures in the CFSP more effi-
cient and legally binding, the special role of 
the CFSP must be abolished by applying the 
community method. 
Sanctions Instead of Politics 
Restrictive EU measures such as sanctions 
are in the grey area between results-oriented 
policymaking and symbolic policies. Robert 
Blackwill and Jennifer Harris argue in their 
book War by Other Means that sanctions are 
less cost intensive than operations and mis-
sions for achieving specific foreign policy 
goals. Smart sanctions can be imposed flex-
ibly and selectively on individuals, entities 
or third countries. It is therefore not sur-
prising that one of the few areas in which 
the CFSP has acted or is still acting is the 
adoption of restrictive measures. 
Restrictive measures (Article 215 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union), specifically economic sanctions 
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against third countries and individuals, are 
located at the legal interface between the 
external relations of the EU and the CFSP. 
Sanctions regulations can only be initiated 
with a unanimous decision in the Council. 
Since 2009, the Council has agreed on a 
total of 1,264 sanctions documents. These 
include both sanctions decisions and sanc-
tions regulations. From 2009 to 2019, the 
number of sanctions imposed or amended 
annually increased from 21 to 152 (see 
Chart 2). However, this also includes a not 
inconsiderable number of decisions to con-
tinue or extend sanctions already in force. 
Only 47 of this total number involve restric-
tive measures adopted for the first time, as 
shown by the sanctionsmap.eu website, an 
EU project publishing legal acts on sanc-
tions. 
The highest incidence was in 2014, when 
the EU adopted new sanctions against Rus-
sia, the terrorist organisation the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and against the 
Syrian government. Currently, the EU im-
poses sanctions on 30 regimes or organisa-
tions, 23 of which are autonomous EU sanc-
tions. The remaining seven sanctions serve 
to implement UN resolutions in EU law. 
Increase in Press Releases 
The Council of the EU meets on a monthly 




Source: Minna Ålander, Annegret Bendiek and Paul Bochtler, A Critical Perspective on Data Transparency in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
European Union, Berlin: SWP Research Division EU / Europe, Working Paper (WP) 2020/no. 02, November 2020, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ 
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the HR. Since 2009, 172 publicly accessible 
and four non-public minutes of Council 
meetings have been published. The meeting 
minutes show that many agenda items did 
not result in CFSP conclusions due to the 
unanimity requirement. Council conclu-
sions are intended to formally set out the 
EU’s position on issues of political impor-
tance, crisis or conflict. They have no direct 
implications for Member States’ policies. 
The Council’s low level of binding out-
comes and output, with the exception of 
the restrictive measures, is accompanied 
by growing rhetorical activity on the part 
of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). Since Josep Borrell Fontelles took 
office as the new High Representative on 
1 December 2019, a new political style has 
emerged. Press releases are used where the 
Council is unable to reach unanimous deci-
sions which would lead to common posi-
tions or actions. Additionally, when a Coun-
cil conclusion is reached, press releases set 
out the EU’s position on issues of major 
political importance, crisis or conflict. 
Since 2014, the EEAS and the HR have 
issued 2,053 press releases on foreign and 
security policy issues (see Chart 3). More 
than half of these (1,206) were statements. 
A total of 78 press releases related solely to 
Council conclusions, and just 47 referring 
to human rights and political dialogues. 
A significant number (315 press releases) 
reflect the high volume of diplomatic meet-
ings between the HR and representatives of 
third countries and international organisa-
tions. 
However, the numerous press releases 
cannot hide the fact that the CFSP decision-
making procedure has resulted in very few 
concrete actions. This, in turn, shows how 
difficult it is to reach a consensus on results-
oriented foreign and security policy in the 
Council. However, perhaps more impor-
tantly, it also demonstrates that there seems 
to be no political will at the Council level to 
adopt a communitarised foreign and secu-
rity policy, which would make it possible 
to adopt common positions on important 
issues and assume international respon-
sibility. Instead, non-binding intergovern-
mental solutions are agreed on after com-
plex negotiations at different policy levels. 
The Expectation and 
Capability Gap 
Different strategic interests, foreign policy 
traditions, and ideas about the institutional 
design of the CFSP, including the unanimity 
requirement, have long been cited in the 
literature as arguments to explain the in-
efficiency of the CFSP. 
Christopher Hill, emeritus Professor at 
the University of Cambridge, formulated 
the much-cited theorem of the “Capability–
Expectations Gap” (CEG) in 1993. Hill’s aim 
was “to look at the functions which the 
European Community (EC) might be ful-
filling in the international system, but also 
at the perceptions which are held of its role 
by third parties”. By capabilities he meant 
conventional instruments (e.g. diplomacy), 
resources (e.g. economic power) and coher-
ence (“the ability to take decisions and hold 
to them”). By expectations, he meant “those 
ambitions or demands of the EU’s inter-
national behaviour which derive from both 
inside and outside the Union”. 
Hill concluded that a gap had opened up 
between the EU’s external capabilities and 
the expectations placed in it. This gap was 
“dangerous because it could lead to debates 
over false possibilities both within the EU 
and between the Union and external appli-
cants”. An analysis of the available data 
suggests that the CEG, as proposed by Hill, 
does exist. All executives state that they are 
striving for an effective CFSP. However, con-
trary to what they claim, Europe’s execu-
tives have not made any serious effort in 
the last ten years to bridge the gap between 
the high expectations of the CFSP and its 
capacity for collective decision-making. 
No Serious Reforms ... 
As already mentioned, since its creation 
by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, decisions 
under the CFSP have been subject to the 
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unanimity rule. The long series of revisions 
of the Treaty over the last decades and the 
fate of the Constitutional Treaty have 
shown that there is no political will in the 
European Council to develop a strategic 
capability to act in CFSP. The lack of a com-
mitment to an extensive communitarisa-
tion of the CFSP has led to the demand that, 
at least some areas, such as sanctions or 
human rights policy, could, in future, be 
subject to the Community method. In these 
areas, CFSP decision-making currently fol-
lows the intergovernmental approach, but 
qualified majority voting could be intro-
duced using the Passerelle clause according 
to Art. 31 (3) TEU or to Art. 48 (7) TEU. In its 
ruling on the Lisbon Treaty at the end of 
June 2009, the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court drew constitutional boundaries 
that set limits to the Europeanisation of the 
CFSP. 
Member States’ low appreciation of the 
CFSP is also reflected in its meagre funding. 
For the period 2021–2027, the CFSP is 
expected to account for less than 2.5 per-
cent of the total EU external action budget 
of €2.4 billion. In the current negotiations 
on the multiannual financial framework, 
there are few signs of these funds being in-
creased. On the contrary: according to recent 
decisions, CFSP funds are to be reduced by 
10.3 percent of the volume of the previous 
multiannual financial framework 2014–
2020. 
... and Contented European 
Governments 
The extensive use of sanctions, the increase 
in press releases and the limited political 
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to introduce the Community method as a 
supranational decision-making procedure 
in the Council of the EU – all this suggests 
that, contrary to Christopher Hill’s claims, 
there is no capability–expectation gap, at 
least not internally. It is true that external 
actors have high expectations that the EU 
will demonstrate a political and military 
capacity for action commensurate with its 
economic strength. But the expectations 
placed on the CFSP within the EU’s execu-
tive branches are rather low. Christopher 
Hill does not further systematise the dif-
ferentiation between internal and external 
expectations and the recognition that in-
ternal expectations are lower than external 
ones. 
The increase in the number of sanctions 
and press releases in the absence of serious 
reform efforts shows that the gap is not 
between expectations and capabilities, but 
rather between rhetoric and political will. 
The data analysed suggest that the Member 
States’ executive branches are content 
with the status quo of the CFSP because it 
is limited to symbolic policy, which serves 
primarily to communicate to the EU that 
diplomacy is based on the principle of the 
lowest common denominator between the 
Member States’ executives. 
The increased use of sanctions and their 
effectiveness as a policy instrument are a 
controversial subject of academic discus-
sion. The Global Sanctions Database of the 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy lists 
about 730 sanctions regimes from 1950 to 
2016. Around one third of these have been 
officially classified as successful. Two thirds 
have had little or no impact. According 
to the analysis, comprehensive sanction 
regimes, in particular, which can be based 
on a broad coalition of states or which are 
imposed specifically against small states, 
have the potential to bring about changes 
in political behaviour. Sanctions regimes 
that only cover single areas, such as the tar-
geted freezing of individuals’ assets, will 
not change geopolitical powers’ overall 
policy course. This is by no means to say 
that sanctions are ineffective and purely 
symbolic. There are certainly anecdotal in-
dications that sanctions can be effective. 
Moreover, symbolic policy can have an in-
ternal effect if it uses narratives such as 
a “unified Europe” or a “Europe that pro-
tects” and if it demonstrates political unity. 
Moreover, intentional strategic commu-
nication through press releases can provide 
a political signal that the EU is taking a 
stance, or express interest in a region or cer-
tain actors. However, it is by no means a 
constructive contribution to conflict manage-
ment or a results-oriented policy. Despite 
all rhetoric to the contrary, Europe’s gov-
ernments have established a CFSP that is 
largely limited to symbolic politics. Under 
a communitarised CFSP, Council decisions 
could be taken by qualified majority voting. 
Applying the Community method in the 
CFSP would bring about the necessary par-
liamentary control of foreign and security 
policy at EU level. If the EU wants to pro-
mote democratic multilateralism based on 
the separation of powers and the rule of law, 
as enshrined in the EU Treaties, it should 
represent these principles and norms itself. 
Dr Annegret Bendiek is Deputy Head of the EU / Europe Division.  
Minna Ålander is a Research Assistant in the EU / Europe Division.  
Paul Bochtler is a Data Analyst in the Information Services Department at SWP. 
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